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YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR :
H I S TOR I C I Z I NG BUS INESS
METAPHORS OF GOVERNMENT,
P R INC I P LES OF JUST I CE IN
TAXAT ION ,  AND “BENEF I T THEORY ”
Mindy Peden
The Idea of Government as a Business Business metaphors flourish in
contemporary conceptions of democratic government. George W. Bush,
upon his 2004 reelection, repeatedly used the term “political capital” as a
synonym for mandate.1 One blogger has suggested that government is
“hardly different from the real estate market,” and many writers have
commented on the equation of citizens and consumers in response to such
thinking.2 Increasingly, especially within the US context, the idea that
government should take a cue from the business world and operate on its
principles has normalized in public thinking. The appeal of this way of
viewing government is that it privileges what have come to be seen as good
ideals for businesses — efficiency, balanced budgets, creation of demand
through advertising, etc. However, when politicians, scholars, and citizens
invoke the idea that representative government looks like a business or assert
that governments can be run on market rationality, they are accepting an
approach to the very meaning of representation and citizenship that is
disputed among political theorists in its conceptual relationship to democ-
racy. Treating government as a business and operating as if it should be run
that way inverts the long-standing notion that state sovereignty is its own
special thing, especially in societies self-reflective of sovereignty derived from
“the people.” Unexamined assumptions that government should follow the
logic of profit-making businesses (because the model is presumably not
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based on failing businesses) fail to account for the fact that citizens may
desire other socially useful goals for states besides running a profit. Moreover,
it promotes a view of the relationship between taxation and democracy that
suggests that people participate in paying taxes in order to receive services
from the state, a view that even the founding fathers of liberal public finance
wanted to move away from, though, as I show in this paper, were unable
to do fully. This business and consumer paradigm can be seductive and its
assumptions are reasonable on the surface: after all, is it not at least partially
true that taxation is the price we pay for the benefit of government, as
important thinkers ranging from Thomas Hobbes to John Locke have
maintained? 
Problems with the Idea  The idea that government should be run like a
business is a significant component of the encroachment of neoliberal ratio-
nality on all forms of life. Foucault noticed the increasingly imperialistic
tendencies of neoclassical economic models of persons and made it a signif-
icant element of his work on governmentality.3 From this critical perspective,
and with serious commitment to naming the discursive formations that
genealogically give rise to such thinking, the modes of organizing and
explaining the social and political world have been noticeably colonized by
conceptualizing humans as homo economicus in an “essential,” “fundamental,”
or “natural” sense. From a political theoretical standpoint, the idea that
government should be run like a business suggests an entirely different
conception of political life than a commitment to political democracy.
This problem can be seen most clearly when we look at how Adam Smith
and John Stuart Mill tried to think through the relationship between taxation
and representative government. By trying to think outside of the idea that
states should be run like estates, as Smith had suggested in his view on
taxation, Mill was questioning the idea that government should be run like
a business. Relatedly for this paper, he was questioning the idea that justice
in taxation should be treated from the perspective of benefits received from
the government, or as it is sometimes known, the principle of interest.
Instead, he developed the principle of ability to pay as a way to think about
how to conceptualize the basis upon which the state’s sovereign right to tax
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rests. Though he was able to develop a different, and many think superior,
principle of taxation, Mill maintained a commitment to the core assump-
tions that the benefit theory model entails when he amended Smith’s interest
principle.
Mill’s first assumption is that of a presumptively just market or, more
accurately, an assumption that inequality of wealth is a result of decisions
individuals make rather than the result of structural features. This assump-
tion has been disputed by heterodox economists and political philosophers,
but such debates have not been reflected in US national conversations.4
Involved with the assumption of just markets is the tendency to not see
how thoroughly markets rely on the state for protection and standardization,
especially with regard to money creation.5 The third assumption is to imagine
citizens as consumers rather than producers of government. This gives rise
to one of the key elements of neoliberal governmentality from a Foucauldian
perspective — the increased focus on management rather than government.
While Foucault observes this wryly, there are, I suggest, reasons to want to
govern and be governed rather than manage and be managed. Political
theorists have long investigated the relationship between concepts like
freedom, equality, and justice within the framework of government, a decid-
edly different term from management, which, incidentally, has no similar
tradition in ethical and political investigation from a heterodox perspec-
tive. These three related issues combine to suggest that the model of
government that an analogy of government to business assumes may be
inimical to the spirit of representative government that concerns itself with
ideas of freedom, equality, and justice.
Taxes as the Price We Pay for the Benefit of Government  Foucault’s
critical engagement with neoliberal rationality helps us to understand what
is at stake in assuming our models of thinking to be natural or immutable,
as in the case of a new tendency to conceptualize government as a business.
But, in order to understand that this conceptual orthodoxy came about not
out of some evil scheme, but by careful thinking that made certain assump-
tions about the world that are disputed, this paper traces one aspect of
neoliberal rationality and the encroachment of neoclassical economic ideas
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on all forms of life — the idea that taxes are a price we pay for the service of
government. The questions of what constitutes a tax, how we define it theoret-
ically and practically, and what it means have been far more puzzling than most
scholars let on. Somewhat strangely for this paper, most people agree that
taxation is, and should be, distinguished from and defined against fees for
services, not the least of reasons for this is the view that the authority to tax
is a sovereign right, even in representative governments. Theorists have long
argued that taxes are not payment for services in the sense that fees would be,
but continue with the core assumptions that the benefit view produces.
That is, payment of taxes can be seen as conceptually distinct from what
one might receive as a result of said payment; the relationship of tax payment
is not a sale in the everyday use of the word. This is precisely because the
legal right to tax is foundational of states and is established by sovereignty
rather than subject to secondary justifications. Taxation has taken on many
different forms throughout time and space, ranging from the monetary to
the bodily (i.e., cutting off limbs as penalty for failure to procure rubber in
the case of the Belgian Congo’s rubber tax), from progressive to regressive,
and from applying to a small number of people to applying to all people.
For this reason, taxation is difficult to define because it seems to matter not
only who is taxed and why, but also who is doing the taxing. There is a
reason that taxes have been the source of so many fundamental critiques of
specific governments — people notice how they are taxed at such a deep level
because, more often than not, that is their primary interaction with a govern-
ment that may be seeing them as a subject or a citizen.
At the same time that the power to tax is foundational, the dominant
approach to taxation has been based on a concept of benefits received, or
what one gets from government and hence from one’s taxes. The impor-
tance of this anomaly may not be immediately apparent, and is the subject
of this paper. Contemporary debates around taxes have significant uncer-
tainty as a result of problems articulating a just theory of taxation, the
programmatic conclusions of which are unacceptable for many people
because they involve a critique of strictly laissez-faire approaches to
economics. The alternative to a principle of benefit received is “ability to pay,”
which can be understood in varying and sometimes inconsistent ways. One
Studies in Political Economy
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way to understand the principle of ability to pay is that it requires a complete
redistribution of wealth, whereby citizens pay to a common stock according
to their abilities, but receive fair and equal consideration in the reward of
government. In this sense, one programmatic conclusion to the question
of just taxation in a democracy based on a principle of equality looks much
like Marx’s notion of what socialism (not communism) would look like.
But this is not historically and theoretically what ability to pay means in
liberal economics.
In this paper, I perform a close reading of Adam Smith’s and John Stuart
Mill’s thinking about the question of taxation. In one dominant approach
to public finance, Mill’s approach to and critique of Smith’s principles of
taxation buttress what has become known as the overthrow of the benefit
theory of taxation. Contrary to this narrative, I argue that Mill’s overthrow,
as it is often known, did not in fact amend what was ostensibly problem-
atic about the concept of benefit theory, but rather continued its line of
reasoning. Further, contemporary thinkers interested in the role of public
finance in a democracy have often continued to employ the deep assump-
tions of benefit theory while simultaneously claiming that it no longer offers
a coherent view of the role of taxes in a democracy. Looking carefully at
the logic of these canonical approaches to taxation helps explain why contem-
porary approaches to taxation in democratic thought have often modelled
citizens as consumers, and therefore see government less as government and
more as management, perhaps unconsciously, and have presumed free
markets as just a priori. It also helps us to understand how powerful the
business analogy to government has become. 
The Embedded Tradition of Benefit Theory  Many contemporary democ-
ratic theoretical approaches to taxation derive from sources that may be ill
suited to the purpose of democratic theory itself, which suggests that democ-
ratic government is based on a theory of citizenship whereby citizens both
consume and produce government, so to speak. Democratic theory can be
variously understood as procedural, substantive, or discursive. I make the
assumption that democracy is not merely procedural in the sense that rule
“by the people” in a fair system of representation always yields democratic
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results; that is, democracy is not only the result of decisions by people, but
includes normative content in the sense that end-state results do matter for
the meaning of democracy itself. From this perspective, taxation is not
merely a public policy issue but a theoretical one with fundamental impli-
cations for what we mean by democracy. This is in contradistinction to the
dominant view that triggered the rise of the discipline of public finance as
distinct from not only political philosophy, but usually political science as
well. The tradition of public finance in the United States depends heavily
on the work of benefit and utilitarian theories that emphasize a fee-for-
service approach to governance that is not only theoretically ambiguous,
but often indistinct about its relationship to democracy in practice. This
tradition tends to conceive of government as having a managerial role rather
than a governing one. In opposition to this view, the Honourable J.J.
Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales, has bemoaned the advocacy
of “new public management” to replace “public administration.” His
concerns reflect my own:
It is important to recognize that a person’s interest as a ‘consumer’ is only
one part of a person’s status as citizen. The consumer analogy has become,
in many respects, a feral metaphor that has acquired a disproportionate degree
of prominence. Consumers have desires or needs. Citizens have rights and
duties. The perspective of citizenship is of greater significance for many areas
of public activity than the perspective of consumerism … Human life cannot
be characterized simply as a series of consumer choices … The courts do not
deliver a ‘service.’ The courts administer justice in accordance with law. They
no more deliver a ‘service’ in the form of judgements and decisions, than a
Parliament delivers a ‘service’ in the form of debates and statutes.6
Despite the prevalence of this “feral” metaphor in the contemporary world,
it has never been a comfortable fit for political thinkers, especially ones
interested in political economy who helped to define the field of public
finance through their work.
To this end, standard fiscal histories suggest that, prior to John Stuart Mill,
theories of taxation were largely premised on the idea that taxes should be
paid in return for the benefits of government.7 Many contemporary scholars
seem to accept the reading of Mill that credits him with overthrowing this
Studies in Political Economy
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benefit model of thinking about taxation. In general, this can be seen most
clearly in the work of public finance textbooks; however, two contemporary
scholars from philosophy and legal theory also follow this narrative. Thomas
Nagel, a philosopher and legal scholar, and Liam Murphy, a legal scholar and
taxation expert, critique aspects of Mill’s overthrow and point to a related
problem in the history of tax thought that has contemporary relevance.
Nagel and Murphy argue that the fact that wealth is made possible only by
the existence of the state means that individuals are not entitled to their
pretax income in the sense that is often assumed. They argue that this sense
of entitlement runs deep and is responsible for a kind of everyday libertar-
ianism when it comes to thinking about taxes. Nagel and Murphy follow
Adam Smith in pointing out that the effects of a tax policy are relevant to
questions of its theoretical justification. They suggest that “a theory of justice
cannot by itself approve or condemn a tax cut, for example; it requires some
estimate of the effects of such a change on investment, employment, govern-
ment revenue, and the distribution of after-tax income.”8 This inaugurates
one of their great insights into the problems faced by a principle of justice
in taxation: what the relevant baseline for determining justice or fairness
is. They point out that issues of justice are often framed in terms of vertical
or horizontal equity. The tax base (i.e., what is subject to being taxed or is
the baseline of theoretical investigations) can be any number of different
things, though in modern societies it is usually pretax income or consump-
tion that serves the tax base. Nagel and Murphy scrutinize this conception
of tax base according to democratic principles, a move that in itself is
welcome. The first of the principles is vertical equity, whereby what count
are “fairness demands in the tax treatment of people at different levels of
income (or consumption, or whatever is the tax base).” The second is
horizontal equity, or “what fairness demands in the treatment of people at
the same levels.”9
Nagel and Murphy make an important point by isolating the baseline of
pretax income as the problem in developing a just theory of taxation. In
their view, property rights are “the product of a set of laws and conventions,
of which the tax system forms a part.”10 For this reason, they argue that
pretax income has “no independent moral significance.”11 The idea that
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people have full ownership of all that they earn in a market system can
never be anything but incoherent and mistaken, since the market as we
know it depends, in turn, upon government, and government must be
financed.12 Establishing a value to money, enforcing contracts, providing
funds and tax breaks to businesses seen to be in the public interest — these
are all ways in which modern markets cannot avoid relying on government.
Because of this, Nagel and Murphy suggest that “all the normative questions
about what taxes are justified should be interpreted instead as questions
about how the system should define those property rights that arise through
the various transactions — employment, bequest, contract, investment,
buying and selling — that are subject to taxation.”13 They conclude that
income comes with a certain degree of entitlement “only if the system under
which it is earned, including taxes, is fair,” and that therefore, entitlement
to (pretax) income cannot be “used as an assumption to evaluate the fairness
of the tax system.”14
The question of entitlement is central to how government is theorized
in approaches to taxation. Nagel and Murphy’s work is consistent with my
own thinking on the subject, up to this point. We part ways, however, in
one important sense. For these two thinkers, although they admit to having
foundational differences in their views on political and moral theory,15 the
aim of a system of taxation is clear: to reduce the market’s contribution to
political and social inequality. They are clear that an unrestrained free market
needs regulation and that the system of taxation is the best method of
regulating. For them, “a capitalist market economy is the best method we
have for creating employment, generating wealth, allocating capital to
production, and distributing goods.”16 In assuming that pretax income is the
basis of entitlement, we forget that the market itself is enabled by a system
of laws, and thus we naturalize the effects of the capitalist market as presump-
tively just. For Nagel and Murphy, we cannot presume a just distribution
in a market society but we can lessen the market’s inegalitarian effects
through equitable redistribution. From my point of view, their argument is
insufficiently critical of the market, though their intervention marks an
important turning point in understanding taxation within the boundaries
of liberalism. Nagel and Murphy represent a valiant attempt to rethink
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taxation outside of the assumptions of the benefit model, but in assuming
a free market rather than critiquing it, they also continue to reify the democ-
ratic state as a kind of business.
To understand how and why Nagel and Murphy can be helpful in
thinking outside of a model of government as a business, but are not suffi-
ciently helpful to my mind, we must turn to the tradition of thinking in
which they have intervened. While Nagel and Murphy offer a new way of
thinking about taxes, they subscribe to a narration of the history of benefit
theory that suggests that in his account of taxation, Mill amended Adam
Smith and overthrew the benefit model once and for all. Nagel and Murphy
mistakenly think that the benefit model is dead, whereas their own work
suggests that it is alive and well in its most significant assumptions. Nagel
and Murphy lay out concerns with the free market that are absent in Smith
and Mill, but their work suggests that even the staunchest critics of the
flawed benefit model of taxation have been more influenced by its point of
view than they appreciate.
Democratic (E)states: Adam Smith’s Four Principles  While it is gener-
ally assumed that J.S. Mill overthrew benefit theory, it is also well recognized
that Mill’s views on taxation were influenced by Adam Smith’s work, to the
point of pure appropriation. To understand this point, it is necessary to
examine both thinkers in considerable detail. To begin with, Smith argues
that the private revenue of individuals comes from three sources: rent, profits,
and wages.17 Smith suggests that it is only fair that all aspects of economic
activity be made to bear the burden of taxation. The problem with the
distinction between the three sources of revenue, he points out, is that it is
not always clear exactly where the tax penalizes.18 The observation that taxes
do not necessarily fall on the source that is allegedly being taxed is an impor-
tant one, but also the source of disagreement among early economists. The
physiocrats, for example, thought that landowners paid all taxes because,
by necessity, taxes came out of the only source of surplus: land. Smith
responds to this argument in an interesting way by maintaining the assump-
tion that public revenue is derived from surplus. By arguing that there are
three sources of taxable revenue rather than only one, Smith continues the
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physiocratic assumption that public revenue is derived from surplus, but
argues that surplus can be found in three places, not just one. For Smith,
then, it is not only possible but also proper that all three sources should be
taxed. The emphasis on surplus suggests that there is a minimum right to
property beyond which the state may make a claim (but not prior). In other
words, Smith was not a libertarian in the stringent sense that he is often
interpreted;19 the state, for Smith, does have a right to tax the property of
people, but only according to principles of “strict justice.”20
Beyond his argument of where revenue comes from, Smith’s contribution
to fiscal thought chiefly consists in his articulation of four principles. They
all appeared prior to his Wealth of Nations, but were never presented together.
I will examine the first and fourth in more depth because they both have
more contemporary resonance and are more directly relevant to the theme
of conceptualizing tax-paying with a consumer-citizen model. However, a
brief introduction to principles two and three are also needed. Principle
two deals with certainty and nonarbitrariness; Smith suggests that timing,
the manner of payment, and the quantity of a tax should all be “clear and
plain to the contributor, and to every other person.”21 In some sense, this
addresses the confusion and arbitrariness of taxation at his time, and its
significance for today could be easily missed. However, a brief glance at the
US tax code would suggest that clarity might continue to be an unachieved
principle of taxation. For Smith, the principle of certainty was significant
because many taxpayers were subject to the whim of the tax collector, and
a degree of certainty would discourage corruption and insolence.22 Smith’s
third principle suggests a similar concern and argues that the time and
manner of payment of a tax should be convenient for the taxpayer.
By my account, the first and last principles resonate with contemporary
debates about democracy, the first more obviously: 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities;
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectfully enjoy under the
protection of the state.23
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Both guiding principles of subsequent democratic fiscal thought — interest
and ability to pay — can be found in this one complex sentence. On the
surface, this appears to be a principle of ability to pay; it seems to suggest
that each individual should contribute to the funding of the government in
proportion to what they are able to contribute. In this sense, it foreshadows
Marx’s “from each according to his ability,” though Marx’s widely misquoted
phrase refers explicitly to what is possible in “the higher phase of commu-
nist society” and not to what is possible under existing relations of
production.24 The second part of Smith’s principle backs this up by suggesting
that property is made possible only by the protection of the state, intimating
that an individual’s ability to pay is measured by some form of their wealth
that is made possible only by the existence of the state in the first place.
However, under this same principle, Smith goes on to introduce an estate
metaphor for the principle, which adds some complication to this reading:
The expence [sic] of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like
the expence [sic] of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who
are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the
estate.25
Here we have the introduction of the interest or benefit principle to the
more general maxim, which suggests that individuals ought to contribute
to public revenue by virtue of their relative advantage, derived from the
protection of the state. For Smith, interest and ability were mutually deter-
mining, but for subsequent thought they have been curiously dislodged
from one another and seen as separate, often contradictory principles. The
principle of equality in taxation in Smith’s first principle has both a compo-
nent of ability and one of interest, though the logic of their relationship
suggests some circularity: proportionality of contribution is defined by
interest, but this interest is in turn defined proportionally.
The use of the estate metaphor is also suggestive for contemporary debates:
the difference between states and estates, ostensibly, is that they operate on
different principles. One key element of this is that estates are businesses to
be managed while states are, in theory, governed. Specifically, in a democ-
racy citizens are both governed and govern in turn, while estates are usually
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managed by one owner, and those being managed have little real input into
their management. This unacknowledged distinction foreshadows the use
of business metaphors in contemporary debates and simultaneously under-
cuts the principle of equality by suggesting that government finance can be
deduced from estate finance. That is, Smith suggests here that the state is
a kind of maximizing agent that exists not first and foremost to represent
people but rather to manage them. Alternatively, the estate metaphor invites
a view that the wealthy are obligated to pay more because of their interest.
In this reading, the state is paternalistically likened to a landholder who
provides the needs for all of the tenants. Though this reading may make us
think of socialism, it is a fundamentally traditional view of the state in the
sense that the wealthy are asked to contribute more but are not asked to
become relatively less wealthy; not surprisingly, Smith’s metaphor does not
point to radical redistribution of wealth.
Theorists of taxation and redistribution have significant interest in inter-
preting Smith’s first principle. As Harold Groves, a scholar of public finance
theory, suggests:
It is the first of these maxims that entitles Smith to a place in the school of
thought that features equity in its tax judgements and looks chiefly to net
income as the index of tax capacity. It is true that the canon is ambiguous: it
suggests both ability to pay and benefits received as the leading principle,
and it could be used in support of a gross as well as a net income tax
measure.26
Groves insinuates that Smith leans more towards this second view, and that
either proportional or progressive tax measures can be fair, depending on
the interpretation. One approach to equality as fairness is to argue that richer
people pay more, though in the same proportion as the poor. In other words,
the rich pay the same percentage as the poor (of income), but because they
have greater income they will necessarily pay more. In the case of a person
who earns $100 in a year versus one who makes $100,000, if the rate is
proportional at one percent, then the former pays $1 in taxes and the latter
$1,000. Therefore, both persons pay the same proportion, but they pay
different actual amounts of taxes. The second principle at play in Smith is
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one of progressivity, in that rates increase with increases in wealth. In the
above example, this might mean that the person who earns $100 a year is at
the very bottom tax group and therefore only pays one percent, but that the
percentage of income that goes to taxes increases as income increases. A
person who earns $100,000 would be liable to a much higher tax rate, say
10%. Under this latter principle, the wealthier individual would now pay
$10,000. Groves argues that reading Smith’s work as a whole leads to a resolu-
tion in favour of proportionality over progressivity. However, those interpreters
inclined to make Smith a progressive tend to focus on Smith’s observation
that “it is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public
expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than
in proportion.”27 This seems to signify that Smith did recognize that money
holds a differing significance depending on how much of it one has, and
that this has an effect on fairness. For him, it was important that “the neces-
saries of life occasion the great expence of the poor [and] the luxuries and
vanities of life occasion the principal expence of the rich.”28
The last of Smith’s four principles introduces an analogous problem. For
Smith it is paramount that “every tax ought to be so contrived as both to
take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible,
over and above what it brings into the publick treasury of the state.”29 The
idea is to preserve as much property in the individual as possible, within
the limits posed by what is required for the running of the state.30 One way
that the state takes too much, he argues, is by taking unnecessary amounts
of people’s time in the collection process; that is, by making too many visits
and thus keeping people from their work.31 Likewise, it may require a vast
bureaucracy that eats up surplus revenue by employing countless collec-
tors.32 Here Smith introduces two other ways in which this principle might
be violated indirectly. The first “obstruct[s] the industry of the people” by
taking money that would otherwise be used in the “maintenance and employ-
ment to great multitudes.”33 This worry continues today, and figures in
contemporary discourse about the efficiency and desirability of taxing wealthy
individuals and corporations too heavily.34 The second important example
that Smith lays out has simultaneously to do with evasion and the indus-
triousness of people. Here, he somewhat oddly notes, “An injudicious tax
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offers a great temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of smuggling must
rise in proportion to smuggling.”35 His concern with smuggling, though, has
to do with his concern that “by the forfeitures and other penalties which
those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade
the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit
which the community might have received from the employment of their
capitals.”36 It is imprecise here whether his primary worry is the trouble of
evasion or the fact that it forces people, again, to not invest their capital in
ways that would ostensibly benefit others.
It is important to place Smith’s principles of taxation in their larger
context. It is neither necessary nor important that individuals have a sense
of themselves as being a part of this larger promotion of the wealth of the
nation as a whole. Rather, the preservation of free institutions of exchange
facilitates this without the cognition of individuals. Kings and ministers,
however, “are always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts
in society,”37 in one reading because they lack the self-interested rationality
that characterizes individuals. Groves interprets Smith as suggesting that by
spending “other people’s” money, governments are fundamentally inefficient
and wasteful.38 In my reading, this inaugurates a sleight of hand of modern
economics: the idea that government resources are theoretically and empir-
ically divorced from the resources of those people. For liberal political theorists,
this could be restated as the myth of the public/private distinction.
Furthermore, it goes against the assumptions, stated above, underlying Smith’s
analogy between states and estates. Smith seems uncertain whether states are
rational maximizing actors (like estates) or spendthrifts precisely because
they lack the maximizing self-interest. However, Groves misinterprets Smith
by taking his comment out of context. Rather, in the passage about spend-
thrifts, Smith seems to be referring to the character of kings and ministers
as individuals, those who “pretend to watch over the economy of private
people” while themselves personally being spendthrifts.39 He goes on, then,
to challenge them: “Let them who look well after their own expence, and they
may safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not
ruin the state, that of our subjects never will.”40 What is interesting about
Groves’ misreading is that it suggests that Smith’s laissez-faire approach inter-
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prets government as not being sufficiently self-interested to look after the
economy, when in fact Smith’s point is more that kings and ministers cannot
manage their own finances so should not be entrusted with the public’s.
Because kings and ministers are no better than the average individual at
managing their affairs, by all accounts the individuals should be left alone,
and thereby the wealth of the nation will prosper.
Mill’s “Overthrow”  When John Stuart Mill embarked on his own discus-
sion of taxation in Principles of Political Economy, he began by quoting all of
Smith’s four principles. In fact, he appropriates them without interruption
and in full, leaving good cause to regard Mill’s work on taxation as an exten-
sion and refinement of Smith’s rather than a serious departure from it.41 His
most important act of refinement, to my mind, is his development of the
equal sacrifice doctrine out of Smith’s first principle. Also to be noted is the
fact that Mill, like many after him, dismisses Smith’s second, third, and
fourth principles as self-evident and in need of little to no explication.42 I
will return to this assumption later, particularly with regard to the fourth. Mill
ostensibly solved the confusion over the interpretation of the first principle
discussed above by introducing psychology into the picture. To this end,
Mill developed a system for measuring equality and appeared to have liber-
ated the equity question from the equality as interest or benefit-based debate.
A generous reading of Smith would recognize that while he was firmly
ensconced in benefit theory, he was gesturing towards the ability to pay
doctrine that Mill formulates from the modification of his own first principle.
This gesture was further developed by Mill, using an approach to taxation
based on psychology developed by Jeremy Bentham.43 Mill’s approach suggests
that equality can be achieved only by recognizing the inequality of the
resources and talents of a population. Through this recognition, one can
identify that “equal sacrifice” does not necessarily mean that each individual
gives up equal value absolutely. In this sense, it foreshadows the concept of
diminishing utility that observes that an individual values a dollar less as she
becomes wealthier: a rich person would miss a $5 tax less than a poor person.
It does, however, assume both that the value of revenue can be measured, and
that this value should be the foundation of any theory of taxation.
119
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Mill’s focus on equality is self-consciously a direct attack on the benefit
theory of taxation. Mill points out that benefit theory leads to the question
of who is most interested in the government — that is, who derives the
most benefit from it. This is a necessary outgrowth of the theory because
questions of how to order the tax system must refer back to the origin of
the government. For Mill, “Government must be regarded as so preemi-
nently a concern of all, that to determine who are most interested in it is
of no real importance.”44 The interest principle seems to Mill to be antithet-
ical to the project of thinking about justice in taxation precisely because
the point is that government interest cannot and should not be divided
individually. Rather, he argues that it is most important to derive tax policy
from the principle of equality, which he modifies from Smith’s first principle.
For Mill, the importance of basing a system of taxation on equality reflects
the larger point that equality ought to play a role in all aspects of government: 
As a government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the
strength of their claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should
be made to bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all, which,
it must be observed, is the mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on
the whole.45
This passage has been the source of much controversy in fiscal theory for
good reason. Mill makes a case for equality, but by the end of the sentence
also introduces something akin to Smith’s fourth principle, which involves
taking as little as possible from people. For Mill, it seems that the two are
not mutually distinct. Because the principle of equality operates as sacri-
fice, it follows that least sacrifice would be a natural outgrowth of equal
sacrifice. It is significant that taxes were best seen as a sacrifice that results
in “suffering” for Mill, and that such inconvenience and sacrifice varies
universally, but in a proportionate manner.46 Therefore sacrifice has an
element of intersubjectivity, which he notes but does not fully explain. Mill’s
intervention is crucial in the sense that he suggests first that equality is a goal
for taxation, and further that this equality has a utilitarian base.
The basis of this view is slightly broader and can be gleaned from Mill’s
focus on distribution. Mill amends classical economics and the role of scien-
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tific truth in political economy, for while “the laws and conditions of the
production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths … [and]
there is nothing arbitrary in them,”47 the distribution of wealth “is a matter
of human institutions solely.”48 This distinction between laws of produc-
tion and laws of distribution does not make distributional issues any less
predictable since human institutions, he suggests elsewhere, are also
predictable if we know their antecedents.49 While Mill was, in a sense, simply
refining and expanding on the views of Smith and Ricardo, his addition
that the laws of distribution are of an entirely different ilk suggests a point
of entry for human agency. Production may work according to economic
laws, but distribution is the product of laws made by humans. That is, while
the effects of distributional institutions may be discoverable, they are very
clearly for Mill the product of human hands. This means they are not only
amenable to change, but are necessarily always in the process of change as
the discretion of individuals affects their very being. In the case of taxation,
this discretion could mean a number of things, including a radical reordering
of wealth in accordance with the principle of equality, as suggested above.
Passages in Mill indicate some socialist leanings,50 though when seen in
light of his actual prescriptions for taxation and his views on communism,
an interpretation of Mill as a socialist is hardly tenable.51
A radical reordering of the distribution of wealth is hardly justifiable
from a Millian perspective because Mill shared with other classical econo-
mists the assumption that the accumulation of capital is the “sine qua non
of prosperity, progress, and the demand for labor.”52 Indeed, for him capital
is the result of saving, which, in turn, should be exempted from taxation.
For Mill “all capital, with a trifling exception, was originally the result of
saving.”53 For Mill, the distinction between productive and unproductive
labour explains his views on exempting savings from taxes, and also sheds
light on why he favours consumption taxes and proportional taxes over
progressive ones.54 Despite his refinement of the equality principle, Mill
equates this equality with an equality of sacrifice that is to be measured not
by what people acquire, but by what they spend. There is, for Mill, produc-
tive and unproductive consumption as well as production, and they are
intimately related: 
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Whoever contributes nothing directly or indirectly to production is an
unproductive consumer. The only productive consumers are productive
labourers; the labour of direction being of course included, as well as that of
execution. But the consumption even of productive labourers is not all of it
productive consumption. There is unproductive consumption by productive
consumers.55
Examples of unproductive consumption include “pleasures” and “luxuries.”56
Here, Mill is responding to arguments against taxing the rich on the principle
that it will negatively affect the poor by coming out of their wages or resulting
in a lost job. By taxing consumption, Mill asserts, the state will only hurt
the person who benefits from the consumption in the first place:
No one is benefited by mere consumption, except the person who consumes.
And a person cannot both consume his income himself, and make it over to
be consumed by others. Taking away a certain portion by taxation cannot
deprive both him and them of it, but only him or them. To know which is
the sufferer, we must understand whose consumption will have to be
retrenched in consequence. This, whoever it be, is the person on whom the
tax really falls.57
Going back to his differentiation between the laws of production and
distribution, I suggest that Mill’s views on taxation are directly related to his
defence of earned income as earned income that is justified a priori and
presumed untouchable. Distributionally, unearned income is the site for
potential public intervention because “law or custom may interfere to limit
competition” with good cause.58 For this logic, spent income alone can be
deemed unearned, or more approximates this unearned increment. While
Smith reasoned it difficult, and therefore inefficient, to tax the very poor,
Mill suggested that while possible, it may or may not be a good decision.
Here we see Mill’s differentiated laws of production and distribution in
action: whether or not we can tax the poor is certain; instead, it is a philo-
sophical and political decision. We see that both Smith and Mill favoured
having the exemption of a minimum for taxes, but for very different reasons.
Counterintuitively, it was Smith, not Mill, who was clearer on whether poorer
people should be taxed at all. For Mill, there is some ambiguity between
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Principles of Political Economy and his other works, though overall he seems
to suggest that exempting poorer people would both encourage excessive
consumption and violate their claims for representation. It is this latter point
that confirms that Mill did not overthrow benefit theory, for the argument
in Considerations on Representative Government is that no one should be
exempt from taxation because it would be difficult to include the right of
representation if a person or persons did not contribute to the public funds.
For Smith, it is not that one would reward certain kinds of consumption, but
that it is not even possible to tax “the necessary expence of the inferior ranks
of people … [because] … the final payment of any tax upon their necessary
expence would fall altogether upon the superior ranks of people” because it
would mean, scientifically, a raise in wages.59 It is a curious fact of the history
of political thought that it was Smith, the father of laissez-faire economics,
rather than Mill, the champion of representative government, that favoured
proportionate taxation with a minimum exception.
Mill’s portrayal of distribution as a site for human intervention leads to
some ambiguities concerning the role of government in the economy. Mill
seems overly concerned with the effects of taxation on industry, a concern
that dominates contemporary literature on taxation. While Mill favours
ability to pay, he argues, quite significantly, “no income tax is really just
from which savings are not exempted; and no income tax ought to be voted
without that provision.”60 Answering the argument that this privileges the
rich, Mill replies that advantage:
Is bestowed on them only in proportion as they divert their income from
the supply of their own wants to a productive investment, through which,
instead of being consumed by themselves, it is distributed in wages among
the poor. If this be favouring the rich, I should like to have it pointed out
what mode of assessing taxation can deserve the name of favouring the poor.61
Interestingly, Mill may have a more insightful critique than first appears.
Though he assumes that savings represent productive investment in the
sense that others benefit from such investment, he seems to recognize that
within such a conception it is difficult to not favour the rich. Further, in
Utilitarianism Mill makes the provocative point that the rich do not benefit
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from government more than the poor, and therefore cannot be more account-
able through taxation, because “the rich would be far better able to protect
themselves, in the absence of government, than the poor, and indeed would
probably be successful in converting the poor into their slaves.”62 Following
his own logic, taxation is not only a “sacrifice” but is also an evil in the
sense that it can work against the very foundations of liberal economics.
“Yet mere excess of taxation, even when not aggravated by uncertainty, is,
independently of its injustice, a serious economical evil. It may discourage
industry by insufficiency of reward.”63 The importance of sustaining rewards
may work against Mill’s own desire to see payment of taxes in terms of
people’s ability to pay. As such, it seems to Mill unjust to tax profits “even
though that kind of income may not pay more than its just share” because
such a tax “necessarily diminish[es] the motive to any saving.”64
This view suggests some ambiguity about the importance or even feasi-
bility of laissez-faire. If distribution is a human institution, then it is always
already the product of human hands. Leaving people alone for free exchange
also has a built-in assumption about the earned nature of wealth. Mill clearly
saw profit and saving as contributing to the greater good and therefore had
difficulty making consistent his laissez-faire attitude towards production
with a coherent view of equality in taxation. Though Mill had some misgiv-
ings about the role of competition, his utilitarian approach reinforces the
cosmology that underlies laissez-faire approaches to the economy. Moreover,
this cosmology is explicit. For Mill, “laisser-faire[sic], in short, should be the
general practice: every departure from it, unless required by some great
good, is a certain evil.”65 Reflecting a similar argument to his views on
government generally, Mill suggests that “in proportion as the people are
accustomed to manage their own affairs by their own active intervention,
instead of leaving them to the government, their desires will turn to repelling
tyranny, rather than to tyrannizing.”66 Though Mill apparently critiques the
benefit theory of taxation, it might better be stated that he actually made
it more complex by mapping the concept of ability to pay onto a system of
economics that equates ability with the status quo, thus reinforcing long-
standing hierarchies. Measuring ability by how much money one has both
assumes that this wealth is justified and also that it is the outcome of realized
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potential. While Mill insists that distribution is the product of human hands,
he does not consider the possibility that production is as well. For Mill,
government is, in some sense, a service, something from which we derive
benefit and utility (in the short and long term), and it is therefore only fair
that we literally pay it something in return. What is ambiguous is that while
government is seen as a benefit, and the logic of such a benefit suggests that
things done in return to the government by an individual are a part of the
larger sense of utility introduced above by Mill himself, this is not what
Mill explicitly says. Rather, we owe certain sacrifices for the maintenance of
society. This throws into question the traditional history of fiscal thought
that suggests that Mill overthrows the benefit theory precisely because,
though he supports “equitable principles,” it is still in reply to the benefit
of government that we must pay taxes at all. 
Conclusion  This paper has explored genealogically how government has
been seen as analogous to a business in the works of two important thinkers
of liberal public finance. But more significantly, it has tried to point out
where the assumption of the relatability of government to a business has
been consciously opposed, but unconsciously continued. In addition to the
more obvious problem of the benefit theory of government is the fact that,
despite attempts to think outside of it, Smith and Mill both continued with
its core assumptions. Because the standard histories of liberal public finance
suggest that benefit theory has been overthrown once and for all (and for
good reason), we may be led to believe that the core assumptions of the
model are discarded. I trace the logic of the assumptions in order to show
that they have not been fully abandoned. The implications of modelling
government as a business by thinking about taxes as fees for a service include
the continuation of the assumption that the market is presumptively just and
that citizens are essentially consumers of government. I trace this history
in order to expose widespread assumptions about the nature of representa-
tive government, assumptions which I would like to question as suitable
for democratic thought, but for which it is now sufficient to merely name
and describe. The idea that through tax payment citizens “get what they
pay for” both weakens the concept of democratic citizenship and advocates
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market activity as presumptively just. The notion therefore seems to be that
business is a good model for how we think about government and this in
turn is a significant aspect of neoliberal governmentality.
Taxes may well be understood as payment for government services, but
if they are, they are not logically distinct from “fees” for a service that any
business or corporation could supply. This consumer model of democracy
is in necessary tension with the concept of the democratic citizen in most
understandings.67 The idea that government finance should be modelled
after estate finance (or that government not only can be “like” a business but
is best understood that way) confuses management with government, a
confusion made all the more serious by the democratic context. The implicit
power issues begged by this analogy run counter to the very conceptions of
individuals that the self-same theories imagine. The presumption of the
justice of the free market accompanies the modelling of citizens as consumers,
and in that sense this paper establishes how market rationality accompa-
nies the theorization of democracy most notably where taxation is concerned.
The contemporary acceptance of Mill’s concept of ability to pay as a marker
of justice in taxation can be more clearly seen as problematic after examining
Mill’s logic and the logic of his main interlocutor on the question of taxation,
Adam Smith.
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